The New H-1B “Reform” Bill: Part III

As I stated in Part II, the ONLY possible criterion for the value of any H-1B reform bill must be, Would it result in substantially more Americans being hired in jobs currently done by holders of the H-1B or similar visa? To say that the current bill “at least is an improvement in terms of required wage floor” is simply wrong if it doesn’t get US citizens and permanent residents hired.

Again, the bill was crafted to benefit the “Intels” (mainstream US firms who hire H-1Bs from pools of foreign students at US universities) and punish the “Infosyses” (mainly Indian rent-a-programmer firms who US firms such as banks and insurance companies contract with for outsourcing IT work).

From the Infosyses’ point of view, their only worry regarding the current bill would be that wage floor issue. The Infosyses generally hire at Level 1 in wage scale, while for the Intels it’s usually Level 2. (The Intels do pay more, since they hire higher-quality workers, but they are still getting a bargain for the given level of quality.) But does that mean that those banks and insurance companies would now start hiring Americans? No!

Come on, don’t be naive. Does anyone truly believe that, if this bill were enacted, the yearly cap of 85,000 for new H-1Bs would not fill within days of its April 15 opening every year, like it does now? Of course it would fill up quickly. And does anyone believe that the employers’ passion for hiring cheap labor would subside? Of course it wouldn’t.

The outsourcing firms would have to raise their prices to the US firms a bit, and absorb some reduction in profits. They would turn more to hiring OPTs, typically with US Business degrees rather than Indian Computer Science, and enjoy the fact that OPT workers are not subject to payroll tax. And some US firms would calculate that it’s more favorable for them to insource, again with OPTs as a very attractive option.

Moreover, keep in mind that H-1B and green card sponsorship, especially the latter, gives employers a huge nonmonetary benefit — worker “loyalty.” I describe it in my Huffington Post op-ed:

…most Silicon Valley firms sponsor their H-1B workers, who hold a temporary visa, for U.S. permanent residency (green card) under the employment-based program in immigration law. EB [green card] sponsorship renders the workers de facto indentured servants; though they have the right to move to another employer, they do not dare do so, as it would mean starting the lengthy green card process all over again.

This immobility is of huge value to many employers, as it means that a foreign worker can’t leave them in the lurch in the midst of an urgent project. In a 2012 meeting between Google and several researchers, including myself, the firm explained the advantage of hiring foreign workers: the company can’t prevent the departure of Americans, but the foreign workers are stuck. David Swaim, an immigration lawyer who designed Texas Instruments’ immigration policy and is now in private practice, overtly urges employers to hire foreign students instead of Americans.

Water finds the lowest level. And so do employers in their hiring practices.